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On December 2, 1970 the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) was established in the executive
branch as an independent agency, thus bringing together in
a single agency the major Federal environmental control
programs.
The Agency's mission is to control and abate pollution
in the basic areas of air, water, solid waste, pesticides,
noise and radiation. While some of EPA's authority was
contained in the original Presidential Executive Order,
Congress has subsequently increased this authority with the
Clean Air Amendment and the Resources Recovery Act in 1970;
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, the
Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, the Noise
Control Act, and the Marine Protection, Research and
Sanctuaries Act—all in 1972; and the Safe Drinking Water
Act in 1974.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 created the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) which requires that all dischargers of pol-
lutants to surface waters apply for a permit. This permit
is not a license to pollute. On the contrary, a permit
regulates what may be discharged, and how much. It sets
specific limits on the effluent from each source. It

2commits the discharger to comply with all applicable
provisions of the 1972 law. If the discharger cannot comply
immediately, the permit sets firm targets. The commitments
are legally enforceable.
An NPDES permit, in essence, is a contract between a
discharger and the United States Government. If a dis-
charger violates the conditions of a permit, or makes
illegal discharges without a permit, he may be fined up to
$50,000 a day and be sentenced to a prison term. The EPA
can require compliance with permit conditions by issuing
administrative orders, that are enforceable in Federal
court, or by seeking court action.
Executive Order 11752 requires that all facilities
owned by, or leased to, the Federal Government must be
designed, operated, maintained and monitored to conform
to applicable air, water, and noise standards established
by Federal, state and local authorities.
In accordance with this Executive Order, the United
States Navy issued OPNAV Instruction 6240. 3D of 24 April
1975. This Instruction states that the Navy will actively
participate in a program to protect and enhance the quality
of the environment, through adherence to all applicable
regulatory standards, and by initiating actions to conserve
natural resources, protect historical and cultural proper-




3It also states that Navy shore activities and forces
afloat, as appropriate, will cooperate with Federal,
state and local environmental protection organizations and
comply with the official substantive standards and criteria
promulgated by such agencies.
As stated before, the Environmental Protection Agency
can force compliance by issuing administrative orders which
are enforceable through court actions. However, the ques-
tion of enforcement and the manner of enforcement becomes
vague and questionable when applied to the Federal Govern-
ment itself. It is not possible for one governmental agency
to sue another, nor is it practical for an agency to levy
fines against a sister agency.
This question of compliance and manner of enforcing
compliance when applied to a Federal facility was raised
locally when the EPA cited the U.S. Naval Torpedo Station,
Keyport, Washington for violations concerning its NPDES
permit.
The following chapters will provide a chronology of
events leading up to the citation and the resulting prob-
lems, an analysis of those events and the importance played
in the ensuing relationships, and lastly provide some
U.S. Navy, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 6240. 3D (Department of




4suggestions to avoid conflicts of this nature in the future
It must be emphasized from the very beginning that it
is not the intent of this study to investigate the causes
for the citation itself, nor to pass judgement, but rather
to look at the relations which transpired between the Navy
and the EPA because of the citation. In essence the cita-
tion provided the means for a look at the problems which





Although the problem applies to all federal facilities,
it was decided to concentrate on the Navy and use the U.S,
Naval Torpedo Station as a case study for several reasons.
One reason was that there was a time constraint. Secondly
it was felt that a subject which involved the Navy would
provide a distinct advantage in that my status as an active
duty officer could open avenues which might otherwise be
closed.
The first -step in finding a solution was to become
familiar with the incident involving the Torpedo station.
The EPA made available all files concerning the incident
and any other information that was needed. From these
files it was possible to establish a chronology of events
which is presented in the next chapter.
From the review of these files it was possible to
compile a list of key personnel which were either directly
or indirectly involved in the incident. Interviews were
scheduled with each of these people. The first interview
was scheduled with the Executive Officer of the U.S. Naval
Torpedo Station at Keyport, Washington and took place on
14 June 1976. The next day an interview with the Public
Works Officer at the Naval Station was held.

6Following these were interviews with the Naval
Facilities Engineering Command's Environmental Coordinator
on 7 July and the Assistant Public Works Officer at Keyport
on 19 August 1976. Throughout this period almost daily
talks were held with the EPA's Section Chief of the Permit
Branch.
It is felt that being in the Navy was particularly
useful because those interviews held with naval personnel
would not have been as candid and honest as they were.
Also once it was explained that there was no interest in
the causes for the permit citation but rather in the prob-
lems that arose when the EPA and the Navy tried to resolve
the citation/ tensions eased.
The last interview was held with the Department of the
Defense's Liaison Officer to the Office of Federal Activi-
ties in Washington, D.C. It was to this office that the
problem was finally forwarded when all local efforts failed.
From these interviews a general pattern of thought
evolved. This pattern was expanded and refined by review-
ing newspaper stories and correspondence held in the files.
Once it was determined that these areas of concern were
at the root of the problem, work proceeded towards finding
a common solution that would be acceptable to both parties.
My knowledge of the Navy system and how it works were used
to arrive at the proposed solution.
Once the proposed solution was decided upon, talks
were again held with both EPA and naval personnel to get

7their opinions and thoughts as to the feasibility and effec-




Since all federal facilities are required to conform
to applicable air, water and noise standards established by
federal, state and local authorities, guidelines were
drafted by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency out-
lining procedures to be used concerning compliance enforce-
ment if these facilities were found to be in violation.
These guidelines were tested in a confrontation between the
EPA and the Navy.
The incident, however, began when a commercial oyster
hatchery experienced unusually high mortality rates of its
oyster larve. Sea Farms, Inc. had suffered mortality
rates as high as 98 percent. Because of the losses, they
contracted with a chemical laboratory to sample and test
the water coming into the hatchery for possible causes of
the deaths. The results indicated high concentrations of
mercury. Based upon these results, Sea Farms, Inc. asked
the EPA on August 14, 1975 to investigate the situation and
provide some guidance.
Pursuant to this request, the EPA on August 25th com-
menced an investigation of the waters in and around Liberty
Bay on which the hatchery was located. As part of this
detailed investigation, the U.S. Naval Torpedo Station,

9Keyport, Washington was given a compliance monitoring
inspection from September 15 to September 18th since it
discharged pollutants to Liberty Bay from its waste treat-
ment plant.
This was not the first inspection the Naval Station
had received since being issued its NPDES permit in 1973.
In fact it had undergone an inspection three months earlier
by representatives of the EPA and the Washington Department
of Ecology. The results of this earlier inspection indi-
cated everything was satisfactory. It must be noted, how-
ever, that there were no samples of the effluent taken.
The results of the recent inspection, however, were
not as satisfactory. This time 24-hour composite samplers
were set up to monitor the effluent from the sewage treat-
ment plant and the chemical treatment plant. A total of
seven violations of the Naval Station's NPDES permit were
*
found. Later on a review of the discharge monitoring
reports (DMR's) submitted by the Naval Torpedo Station
showed that 47 violations of permit effluent limitations
had occurred since issuance of the permit. Again it must
be noted that the EPA was aware of these NPDES effluent
violations reported on the DMR's, but no formal action had




These results were released to the press and the first
major story was published by the Seattle Post- Intelligencer
on September 24, 1975. A similar story was published by
the Seattle Times with the headline "Navy Station charged
2by EPA". A followup story by the Seattle Post-Intelli -
gencer on September 30, 1975 had the headline "47 Navy
3Violations at Liberty Bay-EPA".
Because of these findings, a meeting was held between
the EPA and the staff of the Naval Station at Keyport,
Washington. The situation was discussed along with the
actions to be taken in the future.
A followup letter was sent by the EPA to the Commanding
Officer of the Naval Station on October 2, 1975 requesting
copies of certain logs that documentated violations of the
NPDES permit be forwarded to the EPA. A response was sent
to the EPA on October 15, 1975 in which the Navy stated what
actions had been accomplished to date in order to correct
the deficiencies reported by the inspection and what actions
would be taken in the future.
All previous discussions between the EPA and the Navy
up to November 1, 19 75 had been concerning the reported
2The Seattle Times
, September 24, 1975, p. B6, col. 1
3The Seattle Post- Intelligencer, September 30, 1975,
p. A4 , col. 1.
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violations, but no actual chemical analyses had been avail-
able because of the length of the tests- involved. On this
date a letter was sent to the Navy with the results of the
chemical analyses.
Along with the results, a request for another meeting
was made. It was stated that the situation was to be dis-
cussed and that the formulation of a formal compliance agree-
ment between the Navy and the Environmental Protection Agency
would be approached. The compliance agreement would address
definite steps to be taken in the future to assure compliance
with the terms of the Naval Station's NPDES permit.
This important meeting was held on November 6, 1975 at
which time the Navy was given a draft of the Compliance
Agreement. The Agreement stated that the Navy was to im-
mediately comply with the terms and conditions of its NPDES
wastewater discharge permit and construct facilities at the
Naval Torpedo Station to improve the electroplating plant
operation, upgrade the chemical pre-treatment facilities,
add an additional secondary clarifier at the station's sew-
age treatment plant and eliminate the station's storm sewer
discharges to Liberty Bay. All of these improvements were
to be accomplished according to an established schedule.
The Navy informed the EPA that there were no guidelines
or procedures in existence for the Navy to enter into such
an agreement with the EPA and that no one at the Naval
Station could sign the agreement.
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Based upon this, the EPA contacted the Office of
Federal Affairs for guidance and help in this situation.
On January 2, 1976 the Office of Federal Affairs after
talking with officials at the Department of the Navy in
Washington, D.C. proposed that a Memoranda of Understanding
be prepared because the execution of a compliance agreement
was not the proper procedure to be followed in this case.
The Memorandum of Understanding would contain the needed
actions to be taken to correct the deficiencies and provide
a schedule of compliance.
Following the suggestion, the EPA drafted a Memorandum
of Understanding and presented it to the Navy on February
12, 1976. The Navy responded to this proposal on March
24th. Again the Navy stated that there was no one who
could take the responsibility of signing the memorandum
and requested that their response in the letter be accepted
in lieu of the memorandum.
This in essence is where the problem lies today for
there never has been any official compliance agreement or a
memorandum of understanding signed by any member of the
Navy. The proposed guidelines that the Environmental
Protection Agency had written to cover such a situation
were followed and found to be inadequate.
The following chapter will be an attempt to analyze
why the guidelines failed and why the two agencies could'
not come to terms and deal with each other. It is hoped





As has been stated previously, the guidelines that the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency had formulated to deal
with federal facilities which were not in compliance with
their NPDES permit failed to provide adequate guidance in
the confrontation between the EPA and the Naval Torpedo
Station, Keyport, Washington. Why the guidelines failed
and an analysis of that failure will be the subject of this
chapter.
The concept of conflict has been treated as a general
social phenomenon, with implications for the understanding
4
of conflict with and between organizations. However, con-
flict can be more readily understood if it is considered a
dynamic process. A conflict relationship between two or
more organizations can be analyzed as a sequence of conflict
episodes. Each episode exhibits a sequence or pattern of
development, and the conflict relationship can be charac-
terized by stable patterns that appear across the sequence
4Jessie, Bernard, T. H. Pear, Raymond Aron, and Robert
C. Angell, The Nature of Conflict (Paris: UNESCO, 1957);
Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper,
1962) ; Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict




of episodes. This pattern of episodes can be likened to
Downs* "issue-attention cycle" concerning the public's
interest in news worthy items.
The parties to the relationship may not be aware of
any basis for the conflict until the conflict happens, but
these "behind the scenes" feelings and extenuating circum-
stances play an important role in the conflict.
When environmental laws and standards were first
passed in 1970, governmental agencies thought themselves to
be exempt, in that the laws applied to everyone else but
themselves. This was evident with the passing of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 and the advent
of environmental impact statements.
Coupled with this feeling of exemption, is the
military's goal of national defense. That is, that at
times environmental matters are of minor concern when it is
felt that national defense and security are at stake.
Another important aspect that must be considered is
the fact that the military has always had to report to
civilian authorities. Up to within the last 30 years much
of the civilian control has been oriented toward questions
5Louis R. Pondy, "Organizational Conflict: Concepts
and Models", Administrative Science Quarterly , Vol. 12,
No. 2, Sept. 1967, pp. 296-320.
Anthony Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology— the issue-




of administrative structure, rather than performance or
7 •policy. But there has been increasing civilian pres-
sure to enter into these other areas. The Vietnam War is
one such intervention. Because of this increasing pres-
sure, the military has developed a great sensitivity towards
increased civilian control. Under these circumstances, it
was almost inevitable that tension would be created and
g
maintained between civilian and military personnel.
This increasing aspect of civilian control was felt
with the issuance of Executive Order 11752 requiring all
federal facilities to conform to applicable air, water and
noise standards established by federal, state and local
authorities and the monitoring of those standards by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
Another area which must be investigated is the way in
which policy decisions are made by each participant. This
is what might be called the bureaucratic policy system
and has traditionally been designed in terms of two criteria
Tne first criterion is the responsiveness of the system—
the extent to which it promotes a correspondence between
the decisions of bureaucrats and the preferences of the
7Paul Y. Hammond, "Effects of Structure on Policy",
Public Administration Review
, 1958, Vol. 18, p. 179.
p
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier , New York:
The Free Press, 1971; Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and
the State, New York: Vintage Books, 1957.
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community. The second is the effectiveness of the system
—
the degree to which it leads to decisions which are more
likely than alternative choices to bring about the outcomes
9
that are desired. Responsiveness and effectiveness are
thus the touchstones by which one commonly measures the
utility of a bureaucratic policy system.
At all levels of government in the United States, the
task of creating an acceptable policy system has been enor-
mously complicated by the fact that the criterion of respon-
siveness and effectiveness often point in opposite direc-
tions. Organizational arrangements and procedures that
appear perfectly designed to enhance the responsiveness of
the bureaucratic policy system frequently seem least likely
to produce effective results.
In national security administration, for example, the
effectiveness of any undertaking has usually seemed to
demand a high degree of secrecy in bureaucratic delibera-
tions. Because of this, the Navy is not in the habit of
publicizing their every move in order to fulfill the respon-
sive aspect. That is to say that the Navy is not geared to
be responsive, but rather, it is judged almost wholly upon
how effectively it carries out its assigned tasks.
This, however, is not the case when one applies respon-
siveness and effectiveness to the EPA. Since it is a young





, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969.
10 T , .,Ibid.
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agency, it is trying to build a good reputation in repre-
senting the country's best interest. Because of this the
EPA possesses a desire to publicize its actions.
It is clear that there are a good many situations in
which disclosure contributes to the effectiveness as well
as the responsiveness of the organization. Unfortunately,
in trying to be responsive in their actions with the Navy,
the EPA was not effective in solving the problem. In fact,
the EPA's desire to publicize their actions led to the
first conflictive episode with the Navy.
The problem that Sea Farms, Inc. was having with high
mortality rates was published by The Seattle Times on
September 16, 1975 and by the Kitsap County Herald on
September 17, 1975. In both stories Sea Farms, Inc. stated
that they thought the Keyport Naval Torpedo Station was the
cause of the deaths.
On September 24th both the Seattle Times and the
Seattle Post- Intelligencer published stories emphasizing
the results of the three-day compliance inspection at the
12Keyport Naval Torpedo Station. These results were ob-
tained from the EPA before the Navy was made aware of them.
In fact the Navy became aware of the results when reporters
from the respective newspapers confronted the Naval Station's
The Seattle Times , Sept. 16, 1975, page 1; The
Kitsap County Herald
, Sept. 17, 1975, page 1.
12
The Seattle Times , Sept. 24, 1975, page B6; The
Seattle Post-Intelligencer , -Sept. 24, 1975, page A3.
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Commanding Officer asking for comments.
To say that the Navy was placed in an embarrassing
situation is deemphasizing the impact of this event. In a
letter to the EPA's Regional Administrator, the Commandant
of the Thirteenth Naval District made it clear that the Navy
felt as though it had been betrayed because the results were
13
to be discussed with the Navy before being released.
This was the beginning of what the Navy felt was bad
publicity where the Navy became the central theme and the
public's whipping boy. The Navy felt it had cooperated in
the matter only to have its cooperation thrown back at them
14
on the front pages of the newspapers.
To rub salt into the wound, the Washington State
Department of Ecology on October 27, 1975 fined the
Commandant of the Thirteenth Naval District one thousand
dollars for violations of the NPDES permit at Keyport,
Washington.
It made little difference to the Navy when the EPA
explained that the results of the compliance inspection had
been "leaked" to the press by someone in EPA's office.
All of this combined to place the Navy on the
defensive in the matter and the lack of trust seriously
13Department of the Navy, Commandant Thirteenth Naval
District ltr. 11300/1, Ser. N441/125 dtd. 25 Sept. 75.
14 Personal interview with the Executive Officer,
U.S. Naval Torpedo Station, 14 June 1976.
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constrained any future relationships between the two.
Throughout the entire incident, the EPA had been
working under a handicap. It was not until recently that
the EPA has concentrated any effort in the area of federal
facility non-compliance. All effort has been focused on
non-federal polluters.
This concerted effort gave them a wealth of knowledge
and experience in the avenues of handling non-federal
violators, but almost no experience in handling federal
violators. The guidelines that had been established for
such a situation were no help at all.
The guidelines stated that the EPA Regional Offices
were to do everything possible at their level to resolve
the conflict. If that proved unsuccessful, then the matter
was to be forwarded to the EPA Headquarters, both to the
Office of Federal Activities and to the appropriate
headquarters enforcement office. The guidelines did not
specify what procedures were to be followed or what was to
be. done at the local level to resolve the matter.
The Navy was not in any better shape for they possessed
no guidelines nor did they have any experience in such a
situation.
The EPA tried to solve the matter as though the U.S.
Navy was a non- federal activity. As has been stated they
tried to issue a Compliance Order and when this failed,
15U.S. Environmental Protection Agency memorandum
dtd. November 20, 1973.
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they tried to use a Memorandum of Understanding. This also
failed.
The reason that these two methods failed is simply
that the Navy could not work with the two approaches taken
by the EPA. Why the Navy was unable to accept these avenues
of enforcing compliance is based upon their patterns for
handling situations. This set up the most important con-
flictive episode.
The manner in which an organization handles crises has
been evolved through a trial and error process. The out-
come of this process sets a pattern for handling crises in
the future.
Once the patterns have been established, it is unlikely
that they will be changed in the future. The U.S. Navy has
established its own pattern for handling situations based
upon two hundred years of tradition and experience.
What the EPA was requesting of the Navy, was impossible
for them to do. The EPA wanted the Commanding Officer,
Naval Torpedo Station to sign the Compliance Order which
then would bind the Navy to a course of action that had to
be accomplished in a certain period of time. This required
money which was in excess of his local authority to spend.
The Commanding Officer did not possess the authority
to bind the Navy to a contract such as the EPA desired.




Furthermore, it would be impractical for the Commanding
Officer to sign such an agreement realising that the stipu-
lations of the contract were beyond his authority and
responsibility.
As an example, both the Compliance Order and the
Memorandum of Understanding called for certain construction
to be accomplished. If the cost of the proposed construc-
tion was above what the Commanding Officer could authorize,
then it would be necessary for him to request from his
superior the amount of money needed. If for some reason
his superior did not have the money or it was also in
excess of his authority, then the Commanding Officer would
have to submit a construction proposal.
This contraction proposal would then proceed up the
chain of command and if priorities within the Navy allowed,
it would be submitted to Congress for approval. This en-
tire process could very easily take several years before
the money was granted and appropriated.
Here again, the Commanding Officer has no control
over the process at all. Once he makes the recommendation
for the construction, his responsibility ends and cannot
again proceed until the money is appropriated.
In summary, it can be said that the matter remains
unresolved because a procedure to overcome these problems
has not been presented to both parties. Also, because
of the feelings over increased civilian control, adverse
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publicity, lack of trust, inadequate guidelines and a
feeling of exemption led to the failure of the proposed
solution.
Just what would succeed and be acceptable to both the




It must be realized that all of the factors which con-
tributed to the failure discussed in the previous chapters
cannot be solved with one simple solution. In fact, no
matter what type of solution is proposed, certain hazards
will exist that could cause another breakdown in communica-
tions.
The' military ' s sensitivity towards increased civilian
control is not going to dissipate. It v/ill probably increase
in intensity if the present social and political trends con-
tinue. The prospect of adverse publicity will always loom
no matter what type of solution is proposed. The feeling of
governmental exemption seems to be waning and it is felt
that it will be less of a problem in the future.
This leaves the most important area in which changes
will have the most effect— the area of handling non-compli-
ance by federal facilities. Certain basic premises must be
accepted before the solution to the problem can be presented„
The first is that the EPA must recognize that federal
facilities cannot be treated as though they were non-
federal activities. This is not saying that federal facili-
ties should have separate standards. On the contrary, the
same standards should apply to all. However, when a federal
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facility is found to be in violation, a separate procedural
process should be instituted.
The threat of court action and fines is hollow be-
cause there is little or no chance of it happening. The
government cannot sue the government. The question has
probably arisen as to what type of threat will be effective
in promising compliance. Actually no threat of any kind
can guarantee 100 per cent compliance all the time.
What needs to be considered is the course of action
that will be effective when applied, in this case; to the
U.S. Navy. If the course of action can take advantage of
the military system and the manner in which it works and
still keep in mind the constraints under which it must work,
then the solution should be effective.
The U.S. Navy is built around a structure called the
chain of command. That is, everyone has his responsibili-
ties and authority and reports to the next highest level
in the chain of command. It is the pyramid effect.
One function of a superior is to make out an evaluation
on those subordinates that report to him. This fitness
report evaluates the person's performance in his work,
carrying out his responsibilities and overall contribution
to the Navy
.
The fitness report is extremely important for it is used
to determine promotions, pay increases, and the person's
career pattern. If a person receives a bad fitness report,
it could very well mean that, his career in the Navy is
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over. Therefore, anything which could threaten a man's
fitness report with derogatory comments because he failed
to do his job would be an effective measure of insuring
that the job would be carried out and completed.
Keeping the military's dependence upon the chain of
command and their use of fitness reports for evaluations in
mind and not losing sight of the fact that each man's
authority is limited and that the use of the chain of com-
mand can be very time consuming, a solution can be evolved
based upon these facts.
The procedural process that is being suggested will be
new to the EPA, but not to the military. Why the EPA is
asked to institute a new process rather than the Navy is
because the EPA is more flexible and capable of change than
is the Navy. The EPA is a younger agency and has had less
time to establish permanent patterns of operation.
The new process involves formal inspection procedures.
The military is accustomed to inspections for it is a way
of life. These procedures are concerned with the manner
in which the results of the inspection are handled.
As an example, we will use the results of the 15-18
September 75 compliance monitoring inspection as a test
study. It was determined by the EPA that the Naval Torpedo
Station, Keyport was in violation of their NPDES permit on
7 different occasions, and that there were 47 violations
reported on the Discharge Monitoring Reports.
Once this determination is made, the EPA will present
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the findings to the Commanding Officer of the Naval Station
and ask for his comments. The comments desired are ones
where he either agrees with the findings or if he dis-
agrees, why he does so. By allowing the Navy to comment,
it may clear up some gray areas and may reduce the number
of violations.
For instance if one of the permit standards is
violated, it must be reported in writing within 5 days from
the date that the violation was determined. If it is not
reported then this also becomes a violation. Some of the
47 violations found by reviewing the DMR's were for not
reporting, but if there had been a commentary period, the
Navy could have shown they did send a letter in some cases.
This would have reduced the number of violations.
After the Commanding Officer has submitted his comments
and a final determination has been made as to the viola-
tions, if any, the Commanding Officer will submit his plans
for correcting the deficiencies. This will tell the EPA
what will be done in the future.
Once all correspondence has been gathered by the EPA,
then a final inspection report will be published. The
report will include, the results of the inspection, any
violations, the Commanding Officer's comments concerning
these violations and his plan to correct the deficiencies.
The original will be sent to the Commanding Officer, and
copies sent to his superior and the appropriate people in
the Department of Defense and the EPA.
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This completes the procedure. If it was determined
that in order to correct the deficiencies, a large sum of
money was needed, in excess of the Commanding Officer's
authority, then the EPA could contact EPA Headquarters who
in turn could contact the Department of Defense and possibly
help in getting the money appropriated while the Commanding
Officer went through his chain of command.
This now places both parties on the same side rather
than being antagonists. They would work together.
If in the future, the Naval Station was again inspected
and it was found that none of the deficiencies were correct-
ed nor any action was taken, then the EPA would contact the
Commanding Officer's superior and request that he investigate
the situation. This would be a formal request with copies
sent to the appropriate people in each man's chain of com-
mand. This type of pressure will be just as effective as
the threat of court action and fines is to non-federal
activities.
If one involves enough people in the chain of command,
then the problem will be solved. However, it is felt that
there will be few occasions where a man's superior will have
to be contacted.
This proposed procedure will work for it allows the
Navy to work within their system in a manner to which they
are accustomed. The EPA will have fulfilled their respon-
sibilities by locating violations and they will have a
course of action from the violator stating how the defi-




The question has probably arisen as to what can be
expected if the actions proposed are accepted and initiated
by both the EPA and the Navy. How will the environment
respond? Are there any uncertainties?
It must be realized that the problem was not how to
improve the environment, but rather how to get two govern-
mental agencies to communicate so that they together can
solve environmental problems. The proposed procedure is
an attempt to provide a means whereby the Environmental
Protection Agency and the U.S. Navy can work with each
other.
The word with is very important. It implies unity
rather than separateness . If someone works with another
then there is a common goal and in this case the goal would
be to solve environmental problems. If such is the case
then the environment will benefit.
It would be incorrect to assume that there is going to
be an immediate end to the discharge of all pollutants by
the Navy with the advent of these administrative procedures.
Two things must be kept in mind; the limited authority of the
Commanding Officers and their dependence upon the chain of
command for money which exceeds their authorized limits.
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By no means is this a one way street. The EPA is
going to find it necessary to exercise patience and under-
stand the bureaucratic system. The Navy is subject to the
same budgetary constraints and time consuming procedures as
the EPA.
This is not going to immediately diminish the military's
sensitivity to civilian control. It will not help the EPA's
image of trying to treat everyone fairly. There will be
those who will not understand why it must be done in this
manner and the EPA will be accused of showing favoritism.
Confidence and trust take a great deal longer to build
than to tear down. As a possible indication of what may lie
ahead, it is interesting to see that when the Office of
Management and Budget cuts funds for military construction
which were to be used for solving environmental problems, the
Navy approached the EPA to see if they could bring addition-
al pressure to get the money reinstated. It may work.

REFERENCES
1. Barth, E. F., Salotto, B. V., McDermott, G. N., et al.
Effects of_ a Mixture of Heavy Metals on Sewage Treatment
Processes . Proc. 18th Ind. Waste Conf. Lafayette, Ind.
April 30 - May 2, 1963. Eng. Ext. Ser. 115. Eng. Bull.,
Purdue Univ. 48(3): 616. May 1964.
2. Coleman, J. S., Community Conflict , Illinois: The Free
Press, 1957.
3. Downs, A., "Up and Down with Ecology - the issue-atten-
tion cycle", Public Interest , No. 28, Summer 1972, pp.
38 - 50.
4. Edwards, G. P., and Nussberger, F. E., "The Effect of
Chromate Wastes on the Activated-Sludge Process at the
Tallmans Island Plant", Sewage Works J. 19 (4): 598.
July, 1947.
5. English, J. N. , Barth, E. F., Salotto, B. V., and
Ettinger, M. B. , A Slug of Chromic Acid Passes Through
A Municipal Treatment Plant , Presented at 19th Ann.
Purdue Ind. Waste Conf., Lafayette, Ind. May 5-7, 1964.
6. Hammond, P. Y., "Effects of Structure on Policy",
Public Administration Review , 1958, Vol. 18, p. 179.
7. Janowitz, M. , The Professional Soldier , New York: The
Free Press, 1971; Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and
the State
, New York: Vintage Books, 1957.
8. Jenkins, S. H. , and Hewitt, C. H. , "The Effect of Chrom-
ium Compounds on the Purification of Sewage by the
Activated-Sludge Processes", Journ . Inst. Sewage Purif .
,
(Midland Branch), Vol. 222, 1942.
9. Jessie, B. , Pear, T. H., Aron, R. , and Angell, R. C.
,
The Nature of Conflict (Paris: UNESCO, 1957); Kenneth
Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper, 1962);
Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe,
111.: Free Press, 1956).
10. McDermott, G. N. , Barth, E. F., Salotto, B. V., and
Ettinger, M. B., "Zinc in Relation to Activated-Sludge
and Anaerobic Digestion Processes", Proc. 17th Ind.
Waste Conf., Lafayette, Ind. May 1-3, 1962. Eng. Ext.
Ser. 112. Eng Bull
.




11. McDermott, G. N. , Post, M. A., Jackson, B. N. , and
Ettinger, M. B., "Nickel in Relation to Activated-
Sludge and Anaerobic Digestion Processes", JWPCF
37: 163. Feb., 1965.
12. Moore, W. A., McDermott, G. N. , Post, M. A., et al.
"Effects of Chromium on Activated-Sludge Process",
JWPCF 33: 54. Jan., 1961.
13. Personal Interview with the Executive Officer, U.S.
Naval Torpedo Station. June 14, 1976.
14. Pondy, L. R. , "Organizational Conflict: Concepts and
Models", Administrative Science Quarterly , Vol. 12,
No. 2, Sept. 1967, pp. 296-320.
15. Rourke , F. E., Bureaucracy , Politics , and Public Policy
,
Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969.
16. The Seattle Post- Intelligencer , September 30, 1975.




18. The Seattle Times, September 24, 1975.
19. The Seattle Times , September 24, 1975; The Seattle
Post- Intelligencer , September 24, 1975.
20. U. S. Environmental Protection Agency memorandum dtd.
November 20, 1973.
21. U. S. Navy, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 6240. 3D , Department of
the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
April, 1975, pp. 1-2.
22. Department of the Navy, Commandant Thirteenth Naval




As a result of the September 15-19 , 1975 compliance
monitoring inspection of the Naval Torpedo Station, Keyport,
Washington, the Environmental Protection Agency cited the
Naval Station with seven violations of their NPDES permit
conditions. Those violations were as follows:
Incidents
(a) 2 overflows in September
from the electroplating
plant which resulted in
(b) Paint chip discharges to
Liberty Bay from storm
sewer on Sept. 17, 1975





4 (2 current unauthorized
discharges and 2 failures
to notify the EPA)
2 (1 unauthorized dis-
charge and 1 failure to
notify the EPA)
1 (failure to notify the
EPA)
Total
During the inspection, an overflow pipe which discharged
directly to Liberty Bay via a storm sewer was discovered by
EPA personnel. Occasionally discharges from this overflow
line occurred when the plating plant flows exceeded the
capacity of the chemical treatment plant, which is approxi-
mately 30 gpm. Through discussion with the chemical treatment-
plant personnel and inspection of the chemical treatment
plant logs, two overflov/s had occurred during September.
Because of these findings, the four violations were given.
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The overflow pipe has been plugged so that future
incidents of this nature cannot happen. However, this solu-
tion will cause future problems in the treatment process.
These problems will be discussed shortly.
On September 17, 1975 EPA divers in an area north of
the electroplating plant observed a discharge from a storm
sewer, which appeared to be paint chips. The source of the
discharge was not definitely known. This discharge lead to
the two violations which were stated above.
The last violation cited was caused by a caustic spill
which occurred in the electroplating plant during the even-
ing of September 15, 1975. The spill was not adequately
treated by the chemical treatment plant. This "slug dose"
was passed on to the sewage treatment plant where upset con-
ditions resulted. These upset conditions resulted in the
Naval Station exceeding 10 of their 13 effluent limitations.
This last violation is particularly important since
the overflow pipe mentioned above has been plugged and future
overflows and spills will be passed directly on to the sewage
treatment plant. Why these upset conditions occurred will
be the subject of the following discussion.
The Naval Station has a small sewage treatment plant
which biologically processes sanitary wastes as well as
those coming from the chemical treatment plant. As men-
tioned, these latter wastes come from the electroplating
plant and consist of aluminum, cadmium, chromium, hexavalent




















Figure 1. Process Flow Diagram at the Time of the Study
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diagram of the sewage treatment plant
The Chemical treatment plant consists of a Udylite
Packaged Destruction Unit to convert the hexavalent chromium
to inert chromic hydroxide. The hexavalent chromium must
first be converted to trivalent chromium. This is accom-
plished by allowing sulfur dioxide to mix with the water to
form sulfurous acid.
The sulfurous acid reacts with the hexavalent chromium
to form trivalent chromium. However, this must be accom-
plished at very low pH levels. Hence, sulfuric acid is add-
ed. The mixture of water and trivalent chromic sulfate is
then released to another tank where caustic is added to
raise the pH to a range of 7 to 8 and react with the sulfate
to form chromic hydroxide which is discharged to the sewer
system and conveyed to the sewage treatment plant.
The conversion of the hexavalent chromium can be sum-
marized by the following reactions:






















+ 3NaOH > 2Cr (OH) _ + 3NaS0
This is the only treatment which is performed on the
wastes coming out of the electroplating plant. It can be
seen that if the system fails to convert the hexavalent
chromium to chromic hydroxide which is inert and can be
precipitated out, then the biological system at the sewage
treatment plant is in danger of being severely affected by
an overdose or surge of untreated chromium.
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As can be seen this overdose or surge is introduced
directly into the biological reactor. This instantaneous
contact coupled with the chromium's toxicity can render the
sewage treatment process inoperative and the treatment of
the wastes will be greatly reduced.
The effects of chromium on activated sludge systems
has been investigated by numerous people (see references
4, 8, 12). It was felt that the effects resulting from con-
tinuous feeding and those resulting from slug doses should
be compared to the situation at Keyport's Naval Torpedo
Station, since both cases apply.
It has been found that doses of chromium alone short
of massive slug doses (100 mg/1 to 500 mg/1) is unlikely to
harm the operation of a sound sewage treatment plant. With
massive dosages, the plant recovered in a range of 20 to
48 hr, as measured by BOD removal efficiency.
Concentrations of hexavalent chromium of up to 0.5
milligram per liter were almost completely removed under con-
ditions of the studies. At a 2.0 milligram-per-liter feed,
hexavalent chromium was occasionally found in small quanti-
ties in the effluent. With the 5 . 0-milligram-per-liter and
higher chromate feeds, variable but increasing fractions of
the chromium passed through the system to emerge as either
hexavalent or reduced chromium in the effluent.
The retention of chromium in the system occurred
largely in the activated-sludge solids. Reduced chromium
had little or no toxicity to activated sludge. The digester
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operated well with as much as 3.5 per cent chromium in the
solids
.
Even though the system recovered, the effectiveness
of the system during the upset conditions was greatly
impaired. The final effluent became turbid and the amount
of suspended solids contained therein increased.
This is exactly what happened to the STP at Keyport
during the upset conditions experienced while the inspec-
tion was in progress. Suspended solids went to 76 mg/1,
(weekly avg = 45 mg/1) , BOD went to 90 mg/1 (weekly avg =
45 mg/1) chromium went to 1.64 lbs (daily max = 0.1 lbs)
and hexavalent chromium was measured at 20 mg/1. (daily max =
0).
It must be remembered that the plating wastes contain
significant quantities of aluminum,, nickel, zinc, cadmium
and cyanide. These may enhance the toxicity of chromium.
The effects of zinc on activated sludge was investigated
by McDermott, et al. (reference 10), It was found that zinc
fed continuously in concentrations ranging from 2.5 to 20
mg/1 of sewage reduced the BOD removal efficiency a maximum
of about 2 per cent. Two forms of zinc, zinc sulfate and
complexed zinc such as that which occurs in an alkaline
cyanide plating bath, had about the same effects.
It was found that the microbial floe of secondary
treatment absorbs much zinc. The process was from 95 to
74 per cent efficient in removing zinc at feed levels of
2.5 and 20 mg/1.
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A 160 mg/1 slug dose of zinc, lasting for 4 hours,
caused a serious reduction in treatment efficiency for
about 1 day. Forty hours after the slug, the plant re-
covered and produced suitable effluent.
McDermott, et al. also investigated the effects of
nickel on activated sludge systems (reference 11) . It was
determined that nickel, fed continuously, in concentrations
ranging from 2.5 to 10 mg/1 in the sewage entering a com-
plete activated-sludge pilot plant reduced the BOD removal
efficiency a maximum of about 5 per cent. Increased tur-
bidity in the final effluent was the most objectionalbe
feature.
A 200 mg/1 slug dose of nickel caused a serious reduc-
tion in treatment efficiency for a few hours, but the
plant returned to normal performance within 40 hours.
The complete activated-sludge process was about 30
per cent efficient in removing nickel. The sulfide content
of the influent sewage had no correlation with efficiency
of nickel removal.
These studies were fine for showing the effects of
the individual metals, but what are the effects when the
metals are combined as in the case with the Keyport Naval
Torpedo Station. Barth, et al. look at these considerations
(reference 1)
.
The combination of four metals, zinc, nickel, copper
and chromium, with a total concentration of 8.9 mg/1, had
no great effect on the overall efficiency of the pilot-
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scale activated-sludge plant. No synergistic action was
noted. Approximately 50 per cent of the' zinc, 54 per cent
of the copper, 37 per cent of the chromium and 31 per cent
of the nickel were removed from the influent sewage. The
metals, in combination, behaved independently in their
distribution throughout the process.
As in the individual experiments, nitrification was
almost completely inhibited. This is significant because
the final effluent could contain excessive ammonia. A high
ammonia content can be a potential toxicant to fish in the
receiving water, create a high chlorine demand if break-
point chlorination processes are employed, and possibly
cause a large oxygen usage because of stream nitrification
after dilution. .
With the exception of zinc, the metals passing through
the activated-sludge and discharged with the final effluent
are predominantly in a soluble form.
One may say that pilot plant studies are fine, but
there is always the question of correlation to real plant
situations. English, et al. (reference 5) showed that there
was no significant adverse effects when a slug dose of
chromium, concentration as high as 500 mg/1, went through
the Bryan, Ohio municipal sev/age treatment plant.
A survey of four municipal treatment plants, concerning
the receipt of heavy metals, has shown satisfactory correla-
tion with the pilot-plant investigations.
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As can be seen, a biological waste treatment plant is
capable of handling heavy metals as long as the doses are
not of extremely high concentrations. Granted upset con-
ditions do arise when these large doses hit the plant, but
the plant will normally recover within 48 hours.
Figure 1 points out graphically that there are no
provisions to minimize the effects of a slug dose. Realiz-
ing this, the Navy contracted to have the treatment plant
upgraded and have the storm drainage system separated from
the sewer system.
The treatment plant received another secondary clari-
fier and a flow equalizing tank. See Figure 2. The flow
equalizer allows for the dilution of any slug dose before its
introduction into the aerator. It will also provide an
additional capacity to take any surges or spills. The
additional clarifier will provide a clearer effluent because
the plant has experienced a problem with suspended solids.
A review of the Discharge Monitoring Reports submitted
by the Naval Station indicates 12 violations of exceeding
the suspended solids standards. Also there has been 9
violations concerning the fecal coliform standards. It is
felt that the flow equalizer will minimize the effect of any
upset conditions and thereby help the removal efficiency of
BOD.
One concern that I have is the lack of treatment for
the cyanide. In review of the DMR's, it was noted that































Figure 2. Present Process Flow
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cyanide. It need not be emphasized as to the importance
of controlling the discharge of cyanide. I have been
informed that a system similar to the one for treating
hexavalent chromium is being installed to convert the
cyanide to carbon dioxide and nitrogen gases.
To test the effectiveness of these changes, I reviewed
the latest compliance monitoring inspection report. The
Naval Station was inspected in November, 1976. The results
show that the suspended solids concentration was 2 mg/1 at
the maximum for the three day inspection. This was a sig-
nificant improvement from a year ago. BODj. had a maximum
of 19 mg/1.
It was noted too that the Naval Station exceeded the
effluent standards for cyanide and hexavalent chromium
again, but in both cases the values were 2.5 per cent and
.035 per cent of the values a year ago.
It is apparent that there have been significant improve-
ments in the treatment system at Keyport. However, the Navy
is not stopping for they have plans to improve the plating
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